Policy Moderation Qr Conflicting Expectations? Testing The Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting by Alvarez, R. Michael & Schousen, Matthew M.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
Policy Moderation Qr Conflicting Expectations? 
Testing The Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting 
R. Michael Alvarez 
California Institute of Technology 
Matthew M. Schousen 
Duke University 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 845 
April 1993 
Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? 
Testing The Intentional Models of Split-Ticket 
Voting 
R. Michael Alvarez Matthew M. Schousen 
Abstract 
In this paper we examine two models of the electoral origins of divided government. 
One model is the policy-moderation model , advocated originally by Fiorina ( 1988, 1 992). 
The other model focuses on the different expectations held by the electorate of the 
branches of government , as well as the different electoral contexts (congressional and 
presidential) in which voter decision making occurs (Jacobson 1 990A, 1990B) .  Utilizing 
individual-level survey data, we test various hypotheses derived from each model. Our 
empirical results give little support to the policy-moderation model. However, the sec­
ond model has strong empirical support. We conclude with a discussion of our results 
for empirical and normative studies of divided control of government. 
Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? 
Testing The Intentional Models of Split-Ticket 
Voting 
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1 Introduction 
The recent debate surrounding governance under di'vided government (Cox and Kernell 
1991 ; McCubbins 1991, Stewart 1991 ,  Mayhew 1991 ,  Sundquist 1988) has led some 
scholars to focus on the individual-level behavior of split-ticket voters. Morris Fiorina 
and Gary Jacobson offer the two most prominent, yet competing, models to explain why 
voters select a presidential candidate from one party and a U.S. House member from the 
opposing party. Fiorina's ( 1 988, 1992) policy-balancing model hinges on the idea that 
voters cast split ballots in an effort to moderate national policy, while Jacobson 's ( 1990A, 
1990B) model sees ticket splitting as the result of voters with conflicting expectations. 
But while these may be the two most prominent ticket-splitting models, neither has been 
rigorously tested. 
With rare exceptions (Beck et al. 1992; Campbell and Miller 19.57; Devries and 
Tarrance 1972; Maddox and Nimmo 1981 ) ,  few scholars have empirically examined 
individual-level models of split-ticket voting. Given the institutional and normative im­
plications of split-ticket voting, the lack of empirical understanding of this phenomenon 
is troubling. In this paper we seek to rectify this problem using individual-level survey 
data to test implications of the two models of intentional ticket splitting. \Ve are the first 
to test these models directly using multivariate statistical methodologies, and our em­
pirical analysis supports Jacobson's conflicting-expectations model rather than Fiorina's 
policy-balancing model. 1
*An earlier -version-of ·this paper -was presented -at -t� 1991 Midwest Political Science Association
Annual Meeting, April 18-20, Chicago, Illinois. We thank John Aldrich, G. R. Boynton, David Canon, 
Morris Fiorina, Michael Krassa, Dean Lacy, Peter Lange, Brian Loynd, Philip Paolino, Patrick Sellers 
and Rick Wilson for their helpful discussions and comments. 
1 However we are not offering a critical test. of these two models. Rather, we are testing two impli­
cations from each model, and based on t.he out.comes of the four tests, we draw our conclusions about 
the relative validity of the models. In this manner, we cannot reject conclusively one model in favor of 
the other; instead we set.tie for a weaker test, where we base our conclusions on the relative weight. of 
evidence in favor or· against. each model. 
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2 The Policy-Moderation Model 
For Fiorina, voters make a single statement about national policy when voting for House 
and presidential candidates. Straight-ticket voters express a policy preference that reflects 
the ideological position of the party they support. Split-ticket voters, on the other hand, 
express a preference for a moderate national policy by dividing their ticket in  an effort 
to produce a divided federal government. 
The policy-moderation model begins by arraying the electorate and the competing 
parties on a one dimensional issue or ideological scale. We give a similar presentation 
in Figure 1. The scale is anchored on the left by the extreme liberal position and on 
the right by the extreme conservative position. The positions of the two parties are 
given by D (Democrats) and R (Republicans) . From this ,  Fiorina asserts that voters 
whose ideological positions are at or more extreme than the Democratic or Republican 
parties cast straight ballots in an effort to have their policy preferences implemented. For 
example, voters to the left of D realize that a Democratic president and a Democratic 
House would be more likely than any other ballot combination to produce policy outcomes 
closer to their own idea.I point . Thus, voters in area A1 should cast straight Democratic
ballots and voters in area A2 should ca.st straight Republican ballots .  Voters between 
the two parties (in areas B1 and B2 ), however, should split their ballots. 
But in what direction will the voters between the positions of the parties split their 
tickets? Fiorina asserts that voters believe that the president is more influential than 
Congress in determining national policy. 2 Based on this assertion, he predicts that voters
between the Democratic position and the median position (area B1) should vote for 
a Democratic president and a Republican House member. Also, voters between the 
Republican position and the median (area B2 ) should vote for a Republican president 
and a Democratic House member. In ea.ch case, casting a ballot for divided control should 
moderate future policy. bringing future policy outcomes closer to the voter's ideal point. 
2This is given in Fiorina's model as the "q" term, denoting the relative strengths of the presidency 
and the legislature in the development of policy. Fiorina argues that in the contemporary period the 
value of this term is approximately 0.6, translating into a slightly more powerful presidency. 
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Figure 1 :  Policy-Moderation Model 
L Dem. Median Rep. R 
Thus, this model generates two implications, which we test empirical y using <la.ta 
taken from the National Elections Studies of presidential elections from 1972 to 1 988. 
Implication 1 Voters who hold issue positions that lie between the positions of the two parties 
( B1 and B2 in Figure 1 )  a.re more likely to split their ballots than voters who hold 
issue positions that lie at or to the extreme of one of the two parties (A1 and A2 in 
Figure 1 ) .  
Implication 2 Voters who hold ideologically moderate positions are more likely to  vote for a pres­
idential candidate from the party that is ideologically closer to them and a con­
gressional candidate from the party that is further from them. Therefore, voters 
positioned at B1 should vote for a Democratic president and a Republican House 
member, while those at B2 should vote for a Republican president and a. Democratic 
House member. 
We test Implication 1 by examining voters' issue positions and general ideological 
placement relative to the positions of the two parties. We use both the specific issue scales 
and the ideological scale to produce the most conservative test of this implication.3 First, 
we operationalize the issue a .nd ideological variables by comparing the voters' placement 
3It is unclear in Fiorina's work whether a voter's preference for policy moderation exists on specific 
issues, or on some summary notion of the policy space, such as the liberal-conservative dimension. Jn 
his empirical work, Fiorina includes data from both the seven-point policy issue scales and the liberal­
conservative scale. We do the same. 
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on seven-point scales to their personal placements of the two parties on the same scales. 
Then, to compensate for a potential bias problem resulting from the voters ' projections, 
we include models that examine the voters' issue and ideological placements relative to 
the mean positions of the two parties. 4 These variables are coded one (1) if the policy­
moderation model predicts the respondent should vote a split-ticket, and zero (0) if not. 
We estimate probit models for each of these five election years using a dichotomous 
dependent variable which we code one (1) if the voters split their tickets ,  and zero (0) 
if they vote straight ballots .  These models include the four issue variables or the sin­
gle ideological variable, as well as control variables for strength of partisanship, region, 
incumbency, and political efficacy. 5 · We test the first implication in two ways. First , 
Fiorina's argument implies that the probit coefficients for the relative ideological or issue 
position variables should be positive and statistically significant , since those who place 
themselves between the parties should be more likely to split their ballots. Second, we 
test for the joint effect of the four issues in each probit equation using log-likelihood ratio 
tests for their joint significance.6 We present the probit results in Table 1 (Ideology) and 
Table 2 (Issues), with the log-likelihood ratio results in Table 3. 
The probit models for these presidential elections (Table 1 and 2) fail to support Im­
plication 1 ,  and therefore, Fiorina's theory. In each of the five elections, the ideological 
variable fails to reach statistical significance. Whether we use a voter's personal place­
ment of the two parties or the mean placement of the two parties, knowing a voter's 
ideological position relative to the two parties does not help us predict whether that 
voter will cast a split ballot. The models that employ specific issue variables produce 
similar results. When we use voters' personal positions relative to their placement of 
the two parties, none of the four issues are statistically significant for any of the five 
elections. Using the mean party position produces only one statistically significant issue 
variable in the 1972 election. These results indicate that voters' ideologica.l and specific 
issue positions do not have a substantial effect on split-ticket voting. 
To determine whether the joint effect of the four issue variables improves the ability 
4We are unable to use the same four issue variables for each of the five elections in which we test 
Fiorina's model. The only two consistent issue variables we use between 1972 and 1988 are: 1) the role 
of the government in creating jobs and a good standard of living, and 2) the role of government in aiding 
minorities. The other two issue variables vary in each election: for 1972 we use the issue questions on the 
Vietnam war and taxes, for 1976 busing and government involvement in health insurance, for 1980 , 1984, 
and 1988 defense spending and government spending on domestic services. We use the same ideological 
variable in each of the five elections under study. See the NES codebook for each respect.ive survey year 
for the exact wording of each issue question. 
5We measure. strength of .party. identifkation .using a '!folded" party identification indicator. ( 1
indicates independence, while 4 indicates strong partisanship). The political efficacy variable stems 
from a question such as the one used in 1988: "People like me don't have any say about what the 
government does." The stronger the efficacy, the higher they are ranked. The specific variables we use 
for each year are v269 for 1972, v3163 for 1976, v401 for 1980, v313 for 1984, and v960 for 1988. We 
employ a dummy variable for the South to control for the effects of region, and we base incumbency 
dummy variables on whether an incumbent House candidate is standing for reelection, coding 1 if an 
incumbent is running and 0 otherwise. 
6See Aldrich and Nelson 1984; Maddala 1983. 
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of our probit models to account for split tickets, we run log-likelihood tests for the two 
models that incorporate issues. Table 3 shows that the joint effect of the four issues does 
not improve our ability to predict split-ticket voting. The model using issue variables, 
in which the voters personally place the two parties, and the model using mean party 
positions both fail to demonstrate statistical significance for any of the five elections. 
Therefore, we conclude that this test does not support the first implication drawn from 
Fiorina's model - that voters whose policy positions lie between the policy positions of 
the two parties are more likely to split their tickets. 
Even though our results suggest that Fiorina's model cannot help us predict which 
voters are likely to split their ballots, we test Implication 2 because this model may still 
allow us to predict the direction of split-ticket voting. Recall that split-ticket voters 
whose policy positions are closer to those of the Democratic party should split their 
tickets DR (Democratic president and Republican House member) ,  while voters leaning 
towards the Republicans should do the opposite (RD) .  In Tables 4 and 5, we present the 
ideological placements of the two types of split-ticket voters, relative to their placement 
of the parties, for each presidential election between 1972 a.nd 1988. 
Fiorina's model predicts that split-ticket voters selecting a Democratic president and 
Republican House member (DR) should place themselves ideologically between the two 
parties but closer to the Democratic party. In Table 4, therefore, DR voters should 
place themselves between the parties, but closer to the Democrats (fourth row, entries 
in bold) .  The table shows, however, that in all years other than 1984, most DR voters 
place themselves mid-way between the two parties. In fact, in 1984 only 36% of DR 
voters placed themselves between the two parties and closer to the Democrats. In the 
remaining four elections, that percentage drops to 20% or less. Thus, Table 4 shows that 
most DR voters do not fulfill Fiorina's expectations. As Table 5 shows, the ideological 
placement of RD voters is similar to that of DR voters. In every election except 1984, 
more RD voters place themselves at an equal distance from the two parties than at any 
other place on the scale-not, as Fiorina's model predicts, between the two parties and 
closer to the Republican party (second row, entries in  bold) .  In all the elections except 
for 1984, the percentage of RD voters who place themselves between the parties and 
closer to the Republicans is under 20%, and even in 1984 only 33% of RD voters place 
themselves in the position anticipated by Fiorina's argument. 
Because only a small number of split-ticket voters place themselves between the two 
parties on an ideological scale, we cannot run probit models for each election. We can, 
however, run a single probit model by pooling the data for the five elections. The 
dependent llal'iableis..a. dichotomous measure for which we .code.one (l) if the voters split 
their ticket DR, and zero (0) if they vote RD. We limit the dataset in two different ways. 
The first model (Model 1 )  examines the direction of ticket-splitting for a.11 respondents 
who cast split ballots and who are between the parties . In this model, the critical variable 
is coded -1 if the split-ticket voter was closer to the Republicans, 0 if equidistant from 
each party, and 1 if closer to the Democrats (on the ideological scale) . The second model 
(Model 2) looks only at those split-ticket voters who are between the parties but closer 
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to one party ( 1  for Democrats and - 1  for Republicans, again on the ideology scale).7 
The expectation from the policy-moderation model is that these coefficients should be 
positive and statistically significant in these two models. In addition, the model controls 
for party identification, region, and incumbency, and allows these coefficients to vary 
across election years (with 1988 as the baseline election year) . 
The data we present to test the two implications fail to support Fiorina's theory. As 
Table 6 shows, knowing the split-ticket voters' ideological placement relative to their 
placement of the two parties does not help us predict whether they vote for a Demo­
cratic president and a Republican House member or vice-versa. Of the four parameters 
in  each of the two specifications, only those for·the split-ticket voter position relative 
to the parties in 1972 is larger than the accompanying standard error, but even those 
parameters fail to reach statistical significance. Thus, our analysis indicates that voters 
whose positions are between the two parties and closer to one party than the other are 
not more likely to vote for the Presidential candidate from the more proximate party. 
While Fiorina acknowledges the existence of voters who may split their ticket for other 
reasons (incumbency, for example),  he argues, nonetheless, that a significant portion of 
voters who split  their tickets do so in an attempt to moderate national policy. Our 
analyses do not support his claim. The inadequacies of the policy-moderation model 
might lie in the assumptions it makes about moderate voters. Fiorina's model assumes 
that voters have clear perceptions of where the parties are located in the issue/ideological 
space, that they are willing to assume that the candidates in their d istricts have positions 
equivalent to the national party positions, that they have a clear notion of which national 
institution is controlled by which party and which institution has more control over the 
policy-making process, and that they can estimate with some degree of certainty which 
parties will control which institutions after the election .  Given these assumptions, it is 
not surprising that we had difficulty finding support for this model . 
3 Public Goods, Party Images, and Political Insti­
tutions 
The model proposed by Jacobson posits that voters see the actions of the national gov­
ernment as public goods. On one hand, most voters want the services provided by the 
national government - for example, national defense, interstate highways, Medicare, 
Social Security. Thus, they desire to elect representatives who will go to Washington 
and provide these servi-ces; ·-But these·nationa.1-government programs are public goods, 
and voters as rational individuals have the incentive to free-ride and let others bear the 
costs of provision (Olson 196.5). While voters desire government services , they might 
7We could not. use the pooled data set to run a probit model for issues because the issue variables 
were not the same for each election. Also we do not include a model that uses party means for the 
ideological variable because, in most years, the party means are so close together that split-ticket voters 
cannot fall between them and still voice a preference for one party or the other. 
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prefer to pass the costs of providing services to others . Therefore they might prefer to 
elect representatives who will keep the costs of providing these services low and shift the 
burden of provision of these public goods onto others. 
As Jacobson notes, these conflicting preferences for the provision of public services 
mesh quite closely with the expectations voters have of presidents and House representa­
tives, and with their respective institutional prerogatives. Presidents, because they have 
a broad national constituency are expected to concern themselves with the national issues 
of domestic and international policy. House members, on the other hand, are responsive 
to their congressional district; hence they should be more interested in the concerns of 
their district and the ways in which particular policies influence their constituents. These 
institutional differences between the two branches of American government lead voters 
to employ different criteria when choosing a representative for each office: 
Offered two presidential candidates, voters choose the one they think more 
likely to keep taxes low and defense strong and to govern competently. Offered 
two House candidates, voters choose the one they think more likely to deliver 
local benefits and to protect their favorite programs (1 990B: 1 19 ) .  
Furthermore the recent images of the two parties are such that the Republicans -
the recent party of the presidency - are associated with better management of the 
national economy, fiscal restraint, and tax reduction (or promises of no new taxes!). 
The Democrats, though, are associated with the public goods the voters desire from the 
national government.8 In Jacobson 's words: 
this combination of partisan and institutional expectations clearly strengthens 
Republican presidential candidates, particularly when they are given superior 
marks for personal competence, which presumably contributes to their ability 
to deliver desired collective benefits. It also helps Congressional Democrats, 
because people want representatives who will protect them from damaging 
policies regardless of the policies' broader benefits. 
It is this overlap, then, between institutional powers and partisan images which Jacobson 
claims is the force behind the particular equilibria of divided control observed during most 
of the 1 970's and 1980's - Democratic control of the House and Republican control of 
the Presidency. 
Jacobson's argument leads to two implications which we test in this section of the 
paper: 
8Petrocik (1991) and Wattenberg (1991) have offered compatible accounts (in Cox and Kernell 1991; 
also see Brady's review [1993]). 
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Implication 1 Voting for presidential candidates should be directly related to national issues; sim­
ilarly, voting for congressional candidates should be unrelated to national issues. 
Implication 2 Voting for House candidates, especially Democratic incumbents ,  should be directly 
related to their service to the district. 
To test these implications, we employ multivariate probit models. First , we test 
Implication 1 using data from the 1988 NES Senate Study.9 Here we estimate two 
models, one with the presidential vote as the dependent variable, and the other with 
the congressional vote as the dependent variable (both coded so that 1 represents a 
Democratic vote, and 0 a Republican vote) . Three independent variables are on the 
right-hand side of each equation - an indicator of the respondent's partisan affiliation, 
a dummy variable for Democratic incumbents, and six variables for different national 
issues.10 
9The Senate Study has extensive data on House candidates and on respondent perceptions of a variety 
of national issues, making it ideally suited for testing these implications. Unfortunately, the recent NES 
general election pre-post studies, like those we used in the previous section of the paper, do not contain 
the questions we will use here to test these implications. The 1988 NES Senate Study, though, employed 
a state-level sampling frame which was designed to produce small sample of the voters from each state; 
in other words, the goal was to produce a sample in which the sampling variances were equivalent across 
states. This results in samples of voters from House districts which differ in size between states. For 
example, New Hampshire, with two congressional districts has a total of 50 respondents, split into 23 
from the first district and 27 from the second. New York, in contrast, had 47 total respondents, with 
roughly two or three respondents from nineteen of thirty-four districts. Thus the data clearly over­
represent districts from small states. The alternative would be use of the 1988 NES general elect.ion 
pre-post survey. But, as we just noted, the national issue data we need to test the first implication is 
not contained in the recent NES pre-post series. Furthermore, the NES pre-post surveys are also flawed 
in terms of their representation of tioters from House districts, since they employ a national probabilit.y 
sampling frame. The result is that the NES pre-post surveys do not produce representative samples of 
House voters either, and there is a great deal of attrition of respondents. In fact, in the 1988 pre-post 
data, only 59% of the original sample are in districts with a competitive race involving an incumbent, 
and this is before missing data on the relevant independent and dependent variables is considered. Thus, 
we do not use the NES pre-post data since it does not include many of the questions important for this 
analysis, since they do not produce representative samples of House voters, and since they have serious 
problems of data attrition. 
10Partisanship was coded to express the long-term component of partisan affiliat.ion: -1 indicates 
Republican affiliation, 0 represents independence, and 1 indicated Democratic affiliation. The six issue 
variables were ideally suited for this test. Each asked the respondent to tell which party would better 
handle a particular national problem (inflation, unemployment, the deficit, war, cutting social security, 
and raising taxes). Each national issue indicator was coded 1 for a Democratic response, 0 for a neutral 
response, and -1 for a Republican response. To control for incumbency, a dummy variable was included 
where 1 indicated a Democratic incumbent running the respondent's district, 0 otherwise. In the House 
voting models we- include -enly respondents from races -involving both· incumbents and challengers. We 
have estimated models which used candidate thermometer scores as control variables for candidate 
evaluations, and the results of those models are similar to those reported here. The evaluation variables 
in those models document strong evaluation effects, and marginally weaker issue effects, than the models 
we report here. The results we report here, since they do not include controls for candidate evaluations, 
might overestimate the effects of national issues on both presidential and congressional voting. Even 
if that were the case, our primary conclusion would still hold, since the effects of issues would equally 
diminish in both models, which is the case in the models we estimated including the thermometer ratings 
as proxies for candidate evaluations. 
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The probit models testing the first implication of Jacobson's model are in Table 7. 
Here, the independent variables are given in the left column, the congressional voting 
model in the next column, and the presidential vote model in the right column. It is 
immediately apparent that national issues did not have much of an impact in House races 
in 1988. Out of the six national issue indicators, only two - deficit reduction and cutting 
social security - reach reasonable levels of statistical significance.11 But the important 
comparison is to the presidential vote model in the right column. There five of the six 
national issue variables were strongly related to presidential voting; all of the coefficients 
but the one on the raising taxes variable reached statistical significance. 
But does this hold true for earlier elections, especially those before the sharp increase 
in split-ticket voting? To test the over-time relationship between national issues and 
presidential and House voting, we estimated a similar probit model using data taken 
from the 1960 NES sample. These models are different from the 1 988 models only since 
the issue variables were worded in a different fashion and concerned different issues. 12
The results are in Tables 8. In the congressional voting model, we see that national 
issues may have been marginally more important in the 1960 election than in the 1988 
election. Here two of the national issue variables are clearly statistically significant -
those associated with the guaranteed work and involvement in war variables. But notice 
that two of the other national issue variables, black equality and military aid, had a 
smaller, but almost statistically significant impact on congressional voting in 1960 (at 
the p=0. 10  level, one-tailed test) .  In the right column, we see that national issues had an 
impact in the 1960 presidential race which rivals that of the 1988 election. Again, five of 
the six variables in our presidential voting model had a statistically significant impact: 
all but the coefficient on isolationalism were significant. 
The results of both the 1960 and 1980 models are quite suggestive. First, they both 
demonstrate that national issues have a much greater impact in presidential races than 
in congressional elections. This is confirmation of the first implication of Jacobson's 
thesis. 13 Secondly, these models suggest that what may have occurred between 1960 and 
11The negative coefficient. on the social security variable is due to the fact that the survey question was 
worded "which party do you think would be more likely to cut social security benefits, the Democrats, 
the Republicans, or wouldn't there be much difference between them?" Thus, respondents who believed 
the Democrats were more likely to cut social security were coded l, and they were less likely to support
Democratic congressional candidates. 
12The use of NES studies before 1960 was not possible since they were very sparse on questions of 
national policy. We have a number of caveats to mention regarding these models. First, since candidate 
evaluations are not accounted for in the voting models, we run the risk that variance in voting which is 
actually due -to-general -c-andidat-eevalttat.ions might. be-expressed ·in the· coefficients of the national issue 
variables. This bias in the national issue coefficients will be greater, the greater the covariation bet.ween 
candidate evaluations and national issue evaluations of the parties. Second, there were ten national 
issue variables in the 1960 NES study. We included in the voting models only those six which had the 
greatest covariation with the respondent's voting decisions. The 1960 study did not contain information 
about congressional incumbency, either. This was coded from the 1960 Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Reports. And third, the sampling frame of the 1960 study employed the usual NES national probability 
format; accordingly, it is difficult to make inferences about the population of voters in House districts. 
13Jacobson (in Cox and Kernell 1991) employed a different model and different. data but reached a 
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1 988, and what may lie behind the increase in ticket splitting across this period, is a 
disassociation of House voting and national issues. This is consistent with the findings 
of other studies on House elections, which have shown that House elections have become 
less contingent on partisanship and presidential coattails, but more dependent on local 
issues and district service (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Calvert and Ferejohn 1983; 
Campbell 1986). 
To test the second implication, we collected data on 1988 federal government expen­
ditures in districts in the .1988 Senate study.14 Recall that the second implication states 
that the level of services provided to the district is related to voting in House elections. 
We hypothesize that a greater level of federal expenditures, operationalized as federal 
grants to the district in 1988, should be beneficial for House incumbents, particularly 
Democratic incumbents. 
For this test , we estimate a nine-equation hierarchical probit model of House voting, 
derived from standard voting models in the Congressional elections literature.15 We 
estimated two sets of these voting models, with different specifications of the expenditures 
variables. The first set of models employed logged federal grants to the district on the 
left-hand side of each equation in the hierarchical model. In the second set of models ,  we 
similar conclusion regarding the 1988 election. 
14This data came from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report, Volume I: County Areas, published by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Of all the possible categories of expenditures 
we had data on, we used grant awards since it was the only type of federal expenditure which an 
incumbent might have influence over, which was not the case for the other categories of expenditures 
(like total salaries and wages, for example). The obstacle to using this data was that is reported on 
county and municipal levels. While the congressional district and the local governmental units is given, 
often counties are in multiple congressional districts. To resolve this dilemma, we made two passes 
through the data. The first pass coded information for all states which did not have counties in multiple 
districts (most of the smaller states). The second pass coded information for each state in which all of 
the counties in a district were in only one district, or in which we could make relatively unproblematic 
assumptions about the proportion of certain counties in different districts. This gave us a large number 
of districts, from most states, although none of the major metropolitan areas of the United States are 
represented in the sample. No other apparent biases in the distribution of districts in our sample was 
apparent. Feldman and Jondrow (1983) employed an almost identical aggregation procedure, as do 
Mebane (1992A, B) and Bickers and Stein (1991), although the latter two use different data sources 
than our analysis (Mebane uses the Annual Surveys of Governments data, while Bickers and Stein use 
the Federal Assistance Awards Data System as their source). 
15The House voting model is hierarchical, in which four variables - partisanship, candidate expendi­
tures, and grants to the district are predetermined. The first set of equations involved the four different 
types of contact with the incumbent (personal, mail, media, indirect) and the right-hand side variables 
were all the predetermined variables. In the second equations, the right-hand variables are the four 
predetermined variables and the contact indicators . .. .The last .equation .was the voting equat.ion, and
the right-hand side variables are the predetermined variables and the candidate evaluation indicators. 
The variables were coded as in the previous probit models, with the following expectations: candidate 
expenditures were the total expenditures for the 1988 election cycle and were in natural logs; grants were 
taken from the CFFR data and were in natural logs; contact variables were binary indicators, where 
1 indicated the respondent reported contact, 0 otherwise; recall and recognition were also binary, in 
that 1 represented recall/recognition, and 0 not; likes and dislikes were also binary, where 1 indicat.ed a
respondent giving at least one like/ dislike, 0 otherwise. We also used a dummy variable for Democratic 
incumbency in the models. See Jacobson (1987) for a similar analysis. 
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used a specification intended to determine whether Democratic incumbents were better 
able to capitalize on the federal fiscal activity in their districts. Here we interacted the 
logged grants variable with a dummy variable for Democratic incumbency. All of the 
right-hand side variables were coded so that if the respondent reported having personal 
contact with the incumbent (of either party), for example, the variable was scored 1 ;  if 
no contact was reported, the variable was scored 0. 
The estimates of the probit models are reported in Tables 10  and 1 1 .  In Table 9 
we summarize the results by reporting the estimated impact of federal expenditures 
on each variable in terms of their "first differences" (King 1989). Using the estimated 
coefficients from each probit model, we calculated the probabilities that the respondent 
would report the particular response, first for the lowest value of logged grants, and then 
for the highest value of logged grants, as seen in our data. The difference between these 
two individual-level probability estimates is reported in Table 9, with the probability 
estimates for all incumbents in the middle column, and for only Democratic incumbents 
in the right column (the left column gives the particular right-hand side variable). 
In the middle column of Table 9 it i s  apparent that incumbents do gain electoral 
support through the pork barrel . In particular, the greater the amount of federal money 
flowing to the district , the greater the probability that a respondent would recognize the 
incumbent's name and report at least one thing they liked about the incumbent. And 
these two coefficients, as well as that of the grants variable in the media contact equation ,  
were statistically significant (p=0.0.5, one-tailed test) in the probit models reported in  
Tables 10  and 1 1 .  
But consider the probability estimates i n  the right column of Table 9 from the inter­
active specification. Ea.ch of them is greater than the same probability difference in the 
middle column. Additionally, six of the nine coefficients (in the personal contact, mail 
contact ,  media contact, name recall, name recognition, and likes equations) a.re statisti­
cally significant (p=0.0.5), and two of the remaining three are statistically significant at 
the p=0.10  level (in the dislikes and voting equations). Note that some of these estimated 
changes in probability a.re relatively large. The likes and voting differences a.re 0 .22 and 
0.21 , respectively; these imply that a voter would be 0.22 more likely to sa.y they liked 
something about the incumbent, or 0.21 more likely to vote for the incumbent, i f  they 
were i n  a district with the maximal possible level of federal grants expenditures relative 
to a d istrict with the minimal amount of expenditures. Only in the dislikes equation is 
there a difference in  probability which is relatively small. 
From these results we make three inferences. First, incumbents do receive electoral 
gains from the pork barrel . Second, however, this effect is stronger for Democratic 
incumbents than for all incumbents. Thus, Democratic incumbents benefit positively 
and substantially from greater federal grants going to their districts. We do not find 
this surprising, in light of the different party reputations which appear to constrict the 
actions of incumbents in their campaigns. Republicans, with a party reputation of tax­
cutting and limited government, find it difficult to reap the electoral gains from federal 
expenditures in their district. Democrats, with a reputation for protecting the interests 
1 1  
of their constituencies from averse policies, are better able to take advantage of federal 
government spending in their districts. Third , these results provide support for the second 
implication of Jacobson's model, in that it shows the effects which local issues and district 
service have on House elections. These results , combined with those concerning the 
differential effects of national issues in presidential and House races , provide compelling 
support for Jacobson's model. 
4 Conclusions 
By presenting empirical tests of the implications of the Fiorina and Jacobson models, our 
work sheds considerable light on the perplexing problem of split-ticket voting. Fiorina 
and Jacobson both agree that split-ticket voting is the result of intentional individual­
level behavior. Their models differ, however, on the criteria voters use as a basis for their 
decision and what preferences voters express when they cast their ballots for presidential 
and House candidates. 
In examining the implications of Fiorina's model, we find no support for his hypothesis 
that voters between the parties on policy positions are more likely to split their tickets. 
In addition, we find no support for the notion that split-ticket voters who are between 
the parties are likely to support the presidential candidate of the party they are closer to 
in the policy space. We do, however, find support for Jacobson's conflicting-expectations 
model. Using probit models to determine the relative importance of national issues for 
presidential and House elections, we find that national i ssues are statistically important 
in presidential elections but not influential in House elections. When we examine the 
levels of federal spending in congressional districts to see whether benefits received by 
districts have an effect on elections, we find that the amount of federal spending in con­
gressional districts is statistically associated with many aspects of candidate evaluation, 
especially the vote. Furthermore, these relationships are especially strong for Democratic 
incumbents, indicating that they a.re the beneficiaries of federal money spent in their dis­
tricts. Republican incumbents, on the other hand, seem unable to reap the rewards of 
such spending. 
But while our results support Jacobson's model and not Fiorina's, we hesitate to 
embrace the first model completely while dismissing the second. This paper is only the 
beginning of what needs to be a much larger systematic examination of split-ticket voting 
models. Several important issues , too large to be addressed in this paper, warrant fur­
ther study. For example, from 1952 to 1968, split-ticket voting remained relatively stable 
at about 1 5% of the voting population. Then , between 1968 and 1972, the percentage 
of split-ticket voting increases 10% and remains relatively constant around 25%. Cur­
rent split-ticket models are unable to account for this jump in split-ticket voting. This 
increase in split-ticket voting might be accounted for by institutional changes, like redis­
tricting or campaign finance, by changes in party strategies or positions , or by changes at 
the individual-level in party identification and independence or voter perceptions of the 
parties and candidates. At this point, we simply do not have an adequate explanation. 
1 2  
Another reason that we are hesitant to endorse the Jacobson model without reservation 
is that our data focuses on a contemporary period during which most split-ticket voters 
vote for a Republican president and a Democratic House member. Jacobson's model 
does not account for split-ticket voters who select Democratic presidents and Republican 
House members. A complete model of split-ticket voting must account for DR ballots as 
well as RD ballots .  
Political scientists need to research further these particular models of split-ticket vot­
ing, as well as split-ticket voting in general. The two models of split-ticket voting we 
explore in this paper suggest that voters are purposely dividing their ballots between 
the parties. -Whether voters are attempting to moderate national policy or have dif­
ferent expectations of our national institutions is of critical importance in the current 
reform-minded environment on Capital Hill. As academics and lawmakers seek to reform 
national institutions we must be mindful of the preferences voters are expressing when 
they cast their ballots for presidential and House candidates. 
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Ind. 
Var. 
Model 1 
Constant 
Region 
Str. PID 
Dem. Inc 
Rep. Inc 
Efficacy 
Ideology I 
n 
x2
Model 2 
Constant 
Region 
Str. PID 
Dem.  Inc. 
Rep. Inc. 
Efficacy 
ldeology2 
n 
x2 
Table 1 :  Models of Split-Ticket Voting 
Models for Election 
1972 1976 1 980 1984 
-1 .3* (-5.1) -1 .0* (-3.3) -.67* (-2.1) -1.1* (-4.3)
.59* (4.9) .18 (1.2) .27* (2.0) .29* (2.7) 
.19* (3.6) .25* (3.7) .16* (2.3) .28* (3.7) 
.45* (3.8) .43* (2.2) - .07 (-. 79) -.06 (-1.5) 
-.19 (-1.3) .37* (1 .8). - . 1 1  (-1 .4) -.10* (-2.3) 
. 03 (.26) - . 14* (-2.5) - .39 (- .24) .08 (.75) 
- .28 (- .91) .24 (.61) -.00 (-.03) -.15 (- .66) 
769 497 392 776 
75.86t 23.82t 12.38t 27.90t 
- 1 .3* (-5 .1) -1 .0* (-3.3) -.87* (-2.0) - .55 (- 1 .5) 
.57* (4.8) . 1 9  (1 .3) .26* (1 .8) .30* (2.8) 
.20* (3.7) .24* (3.5) . 16* (2.3) .29* (3.7) 
.46* (3.9) .43* (2.2) -.02 (- .23) - . 1 7* (-2.5) 
- . 18 (-1 .2) .36* (1 .8) - .06 (- .50) - .20* (-3.0) 
.03 ( .24) - . 14* (-2.6) - .04 (- .24) .09 (.83) 
.00 (.01) .10 (.83) . 13  (.63) - .35* (-2.0) 
769 497 392 776 
75.00t 24 . 14t 12. 77t 31 .55t 
1988 
- 1 .6* (-3.4) 
.15 (.83) 
.50* (3.7) 
-.15 (-1 . 5) 
-.17 (-1 .6) 
-.99 (-. 77) 
.. 17 (.98) 
329 
23.03t 
- 1 .2* (-2.0) 
. 1 5  (.85) 
.50* (3. 7) 
- .24* (- 1 .8) 
- .26* (- 1 .8) 
- . 1 1  (- .83) 
- . 14  (- .60) 
329 
22.44t
Note: The dependent variable m each model ts a dichotomous md1cator of whether
the respondent split their ballot (1) or voted a straight-ticket (0). Ideology a.nd issue
variables followed by a "1" indicates the voters' placement relative to their personal
placement of the parties; those with a "2" after them indicate the voters' placement
relative to the mean party positions. Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates, with
t-scores in parentheses. An * denotes an estimate which is statistically significant at
p=.05 , with a one-tailed test. An t indicates a x2 significant at p=.05.
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Ind. 
Var. 
Model 3 
Constant 
Region 
Str. PID 
Dem. Inc 
Rep. Inc 
Efficacy 
Vietnaml 
Jobsl 
Taxesl 
Minorities! 
Busingl 
Gov't Insl 
Defensel 
Gov't Spl 
n 
x2
Model 4 
Constant 
Region 
Str. PID 
Dem. Inc. 
Rep. Inc. 
Efficacy 
Vietnam2 
Johs2 
Taxes2 
Minorities2 
Busing2 
Gov't Ins2 
Defense2 
Gov't Sp2 
n 
x2 
Table 2 :  Models of Split-Ticket Voting 
Models for Election 
1972 1976 1980 1984 
-1 .3* (-5.3) - .99* (-3.3)  -.67* ( -2.2) -1.2* (-4.5) 
.57* (4.8) . 1 8  (1.2) .28* (2.0) .30* (2.7) 
.20* (3.7) .25* (3.6) .17* (2.3) .29* (3.8) 
.46* (3.9) .44* (2.2) -.08 (-.98) -.06 (-1 .3) 
-. 18 (-1 .3) .35* ( 1 .7) -. 1 1  (-1 .4) -.09* (-2.2) 
.03 ( .29) - . 14* (-2.6 )  -.02 (-. 1 5) .07 ( .67) 
-.33 (-.44) 
. 31 ( .82) -.07 (-.13) -.26 (-1 .3) . 1 3  (.98) 
. 13  ( .29) 
. 12 ( .20) .37 (.72) -.01 (-.05) .96 (.39) 
.46 ( .  74) 
3.4 (.82) 
.22 (1. 1 )  . 1 3  ( .26) 
-.49 (-.76) -. 15  (-. 13) 
769 497 392 776 
76.00t 27.07t 1 5.72 28.72t 
-1 .3* (-5.2) -1 . 1 *  (-3.5) -.54 (-1.6) -1 .5* (-4.2) 
. 58* (4.8) .21 (1 .4) .27* ( 1 . 9) .29* (2.6) 
.20* (3.7) .24* (3.6) . 1 7* (2.4) .29* (3.7) 
.46* (3.9) .44* (2.2) -.09 (-1. 1 )  -.07 (-1.6) 
-.18 (-1.3) .39* (1.9) -. 13  (-1 .6 )  -.09* (-2 . 1 )  
.01 ( .10) -. 15* (-2.7) -.06 (-.37) .09 (.80) 
-.13 (-1.2) 
.24* (2.2) .17 (1.2) .46 (.26) .02 ( .21 )  
.04 ( .34) 
-.03 (-.23) .17 (1.3) -. 12 (-.75) .06 ( .70) 
-.40 (-1.6) 
.28 (1.3) 
.02 (.14) .07 (.72) 
-.25 (-1 .6) - .07 (- .  70) 
7-69 .497 392 776 
81.50t 30.97t 15 .96 28.71 t 
1988 
-1 .4* (-3 . 1 )  
. 15 (.85) 
.50* (3.7) 
-.20* (-2.0) 
-.21 * ( -2.0) 
-. 14  (-1 . 1 )  
.04 ( .16) 
- .36 (-1.4) 
. 13 ( .62) 
.34 (.85) 
392 
25.04t 
-1 .6* (-3 .5)  
.17 ( .92) 
. . 51 * (3.8) 
-.19* (-1.9) 
-.19* (-1 .8) 
-.09 (-.73) 
.09 (.5 1 )  
-.09 (-.46) 
.30* (1.8) 
.00 (.02) 
392 
2.5. 72t 
Note: The dependent vanable m each model is a dichotomous md1cator of whether 
the respondent split their ballot (1) or voted a straight-ticket (0) .  Ideology and issue 
variables followed by a "1" indicates the voters' placement relative to their personal 
placement of the parties. Those with a "2" after them indicate the voters' placement 
relative to the mean party positions. Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates, with 
t-scores in parentheses. An * denotes an estimate which is statistically significant at 
p=.05, with a one-tailed test. An t indicates a x2 significant at p=.0.5.
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Table 3 :  Log-Likelihood Tests for Issue Importance 
Models and Ratios 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 
.Unconstrained LL -438.27 -271.80 -236.08 -435.34 -170.31  
(Model 1 )  
lssuesl Constrained LL -437.78 -269.99 -234.41 -434.71 -168.83 
(Model 4) 
x2 .84 3.62 3.34 1.26 2.96 
(Models 1 and 4) (4) (4) (4) .(4) (4) 
lssues2 Constrained LL -435.03 -268.04 -.234.29 -434.71 -168.49 
(Model 5) 
x2 6.48 7.52 3.58 1 .26 3.64 
(Models 1 and 5) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
Note: Entnes m row one are the log-hkehhoods from the max1mum­
likelihood models in Table 1 ,  those in rows two and four are log- like­
lihoods from identical models where the issue coefficients have been 
constrained to be zero, and the third and fifth rows are twice the differ­
ence between the constrained and unconstrained log-likelihoods. None 
of the log-likelihoods reported in this table are statistically significant. 
Table 4: Split-ticket voters and party positions 
DR Voters (in percents) 
Position 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 
Outside R 10 1 1  2 5 1 1  
Closer R 2 9 2 1 5  7 
Equal 48 32 58 26 43 
Closer D 8 19 20 36 12 
Outside D 33 30 18 18  27 
Note: The entries are percentages of voters casting a ballot for a Demo­
cratic president and Republican House member in the particular elec­
tion year. Outside R (D) refers to a voter who is outside the Repu b­
lican (Democratic) party; Closer R (D)  a voter who is .between the 
parties, but closer to the Republicans (Democrats) ;  Equal a voter who 
is equidistant between the parties. 
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Table 5: Split-ticket voters and party positions 
RD Voters (in percents) 
Position 1972 1976 1980 1984 
Outside R 29 53 17 20 
Closer R 7 14 11 33 
Equal 4 7 23 58 20 
Closer D 5 5 9 17 
Outside D 11 5 5 8 
1988 
30 
14 
43 
5 
7 
Note: The entries are percentages of voters casting a ballot for a Re­
publican president and Democratic House member in the particular 
election year. Outside R (D) refers to a voter who is outside the Re­
publican (Democratic) party; Closer R (D) a voter who is between the 
parties, but closer to the Republicans (Democrats); Equal a voter who 
is equidistant between the parties. 
17 
Table 6 :  Pooled Model of Direction of Ticket-Splitting, 1 972-1988 
Prob. of DR Split: 
Ind. 
Var. Model 1 Model 2 
Constant -.64* (-4.6) -.69* (-3.9) 
Region (1972) -1.1* (-1.9) -.88 ( -1 .3) 
Region ( 1976) -.1 1  (-.19) -.02 (-.03) 
Region ( 1980) . 14  (.21) .92 (.95) 
Region ( 1984) -.39 (-.65) -.71 (-.93) 
Dem. Id. ( 1972) .05 (.25) -.1 1 (-.42) 
Dem. Id. ( 1976) .41* ( 1 .7) .73 ( 1 .6) 
Dem. Id. ( 1980) -.17 (-.48) .17 (.32) 
Dem. Id. ( 1984) .7.5* (2.9) .79* (3.0) 
Dem. Inc. ( 1972) -1.0* (-2.5) -1.1 (-1.6) 
Dem. Inc. ( 1976) -.65 (-1.5) -1.5* (-1.7) 
Dem. Inc. ( 1980) -3.9 (-.32) -4.5 (-.29) 
Dem. Inc. ( 1984) -.97* (-2.6) -.78* (-1.9) 
Rep. Inc. ( 1972) .13 (.32) .19 (.31 )  
Rep. Inc. ( 1976) 1.6* (4.3) 2.0* (3.0) 
Rep. Inc. ( 1980) .99 ( 1 .4) 1.6* ( 1 .9) 
Rep. Inc. ( 1984) 1 ..5* (3.1) 1 .4* (2.7) 
Ideology ( 1972) .59 ( 1 .6) .60 ( 1.3) 
Ideology ( 1976) .09 ( .25) -.09 (-.18) 
Ideology ( 1980) .49 (.87) -.32 (-.37) 
Ideology ( 1984) .10 (.35) .08 (.26) 
x2 1 150.9t 1239.0t 
Note: Entries are maximum-likeli ood probit estimates, accompanied 
with t-statistics. * indicates statistical significance at the p=0.0.5 level, 
one-tailed test. An t indicates a x2 significant at the p=.05 level. The
two models differ in their specification of the ideological positioning 
variables: in the Model 1 specification, the coding of the variable is 
-1 for those closer to the Republicans, 0 for those equidistant from 
both parties, and 1 for those closer to the Democrats; the Model 2 
specification drops those equidistant from both parties. The sample 
contains only split-ticket voters between the parties. 
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Table 7: Congressional and Presidential Voting Models, 1988 
Independent Congressional Presidential 
Variables Vote Vote 
Constant -. 74* (-8.5) -.44* (-5.9) 
Partisanship .54* (6.9) .88* ( 10.5) 
Dem. Inc. 1.5* (15.4) 
Inflation . . �  ..... .05 ( .61) .48* (4.9) 
Unemployment . 04 (.50) .57* (6.5) . 
Deficit .19* (2.4) .37* (4.2) 
War .04 ( .56) .20* (2.5) 
Social Sec. -.17* (-2.1) -.42* (-4.6) 
Taxes .06 (.89) .06 (.75) 
x2 426.62t 860.16t 
Note: Entries in the table are maximum-likelihood estimates, with t­
scores in parentheses. An * denotes an estimate which is statistically 
significant at p=0.05, one-tailed test. An t indicates a x2 significant
at p=0.05. In both models the dependent variable is Democratic vote 
( 1 ), Republican vote (0). 
Table 8: Congressional and Presidential Voting Models, 1960 
Independent Congressional Presidential 
Variables Vote Vote 
Constant -.48* (-2.5) .04 (.26) 
Partisanship .89* (7.0) .72* (5.6) 
Dem. inc. . 75* (3.7) 
Housing .08 (.55) .48* (3.2) 
Jobs .29* ( 1 .9) .42* (2.5) 
Isolationism -0.65 (-.35) -.08 (- .37) 
Bia.ck Equality .19 ( 1 .2) .52* (3.0) 
Military Aid .26 ( 1 .2) .46* ( 1.9) 
War . 55* (3.4) 1.1 * (6.3) 
x2 216.07t 276.t>4t 
Note: Entnes m the table are max1mum-ltkelihood estimates, with t­
scores in parentheses. An * denotes an estimate which is statistically 
significant at p=0.05, one-tailed test. An t indicates a x2 significant
at p=0.05. In both models the dependent variable is Democratic vote 
( 1  ) ,  Republican vote (0). 
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Table 9: Effects of Federal District Expenditures, 1 988 
Maximum Difference in  Probability: 
Endogenous All Democratic 
Variable Incumbents Incumbents 
Personal 0.06 0. 1 4
Contactt 
Mail 
Contactt 
Media 
Contactt 
Indirect 
Contactt 
Name 
Recall+ 
Name 
Recognize+ 
Likes+ 
Dislikes+ 
Vote§ 
0.02 
0.07 
0.08 
0 .06 
0 . 14  
0 . 14  
-0.05 
0 . 1 1  
0. 13
0 . 12  
0 .10 
0 . 16  
0 . 13  
0.22 
-0.06 
0.21 
Note: The entries are the maximum estimated differences in the prob­
ability that the respondent would report the phenomenon listed in the 
left column, calculated across the possible range of Federal grants to 
the particular district . t indicates probabilities estimated under the 
assumptions that the respondent was an independent in a district with 
a Democratic incumbent, where both candidates had average logged 
campaign expenditures; + are probabilities estimated assuming an in­
dependent respondent with a Democratic incumbent, average campaign 
expenditures, and with only personal and mail contact; § are probabili­
ties estimated assuming an independent respondent .with .a Democratic 
incumbent and average campaign expenditures. 
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Table 10: House Incumbents and Local Federal Expenditures, 1988 
Probability of Incumbent: 
Ind. Personal Mail · Media Indirect Name Name 
Variables Contact Contact Contact Contact Recall Recogize Likes Dislikes 
Intercept - 1 .6* . 127 -.714 - 1 .98 ... -3.18** -4.81** -3.84** -. 191  
(-1 .61) (.125) (-.58) (-1 .98) (-3.0) (-2.84) (-3 .69) (-. 154) 
Partisan . 17** .002 . 139* .093 -.021 -.085 .253** -.365** 
Agreement (2.27) (.031) (1.44) (.24) (-.26) (-.708) (3.22) (-3.66) 
Inc. .013 .001 -.013 .019 .006 -.094* -.004 -.056* 
Expend. ( .458) (.036) (-.346) (.69) (. 162) (-1.29) (-. 132) (-1.65) 
Chai. -.017* .001 -.004 -.01 .062** .0366** -.012 .062** 
Expend. (-1.45) (.086) (-.255) (-.86) (4 .18) (2.17) (-.932) (3.24) 
Federal .087 .033 . 164** . 108* .083 .461 ** . 193** - . 13*
Grants (1 .09) ( .416) (1.68) (1.35) (1.0) (3.74) (2.33) (-1.3) 
Personal .545** .531** .703** .268**
Contact (6 .14) (2.67) (8.0) (2. 61) 
Mail .519** .645** .581** .286** 
Contact (4.68) (4.66) (5.6) (2. 12) 
Media .364** .974** .743** .468** 
Contact (2.17) (6.74) (4.3) (2.08) 
Indirect . 143* .041 . 166** .299** 
Contact (1.61) (.237) (1.89) (2.92) 
Name 
Recall 
Name 
Recognize 
Likes 
Dislikes 
Dem. Inc. .04 .063 .05 -.037 -. 127* . 154* -.097 -.002 
(.539) (.827) (.537) (-.49) (-1.6) (1.29) (-1 .25) (.02) 
x:t 152.4t 128.6t 90.76t 150.8t 340.28t 308.14= dag 450.48t 207.6t
Note: Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates, with t-scores in parentheses. An ** denotes an 
estimate statistically significant at p=0.05, while ** denotes a p=0. 10 level, both one-tailed tests. 
An t indicates a x2 significant at p=.05.
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Vote 
-2.28* 
(-1 .37) 
1.24 
(.08) 
. 133** 
(2.74) 
-.075** 
(-2.87) 
.131  
( .968) 
-.279** 
(-2. 14) 
. 102 
(.352) 
1.28** 
. (9.47) 
-1.06** 
(-7 . 15) 
-.177* 
(-1.4) 
340.28t 
Table 1 1: Democratic House Incumbents and Local Federal Expenditures, 1988 
Probability of Incumbent: 
Ind. Personal Mail Media Indirect Name Name 
Variables Contact Contact Contact Contact Recall Recogize Likes Dislikes Vote 
Intercept -.447* .644""" 1.4•• -.615"'* -2.03"'* .947 -1.37*"' -1.84*"' -.592 
(-1.4) (1.91) (3.04) (-1.91) (-4.8) (1.04) (-3.78) (-4.31) (-1.01) 
Partisan .171** .004 .14* .094 -.019 -.096 .257** -.366** 1.25** 
Agreement (2.28) (.05) (1.44) (1.24) (-.239) (-.802) (3.27) (-3.67) (8.09) 
Inc. .007 -.006 -.022 .016 -.003 -.11* -.012 -.052* .124** 
Expend. (.24) (-.192) (-.548) (.567) (-.10) (-1.42) (-.432) (-1.49) (2.54) 
Chai. -.018* -.0005 -.003 -.009 .062** .046** -.01 .06** -.074** 
Expend. (-1.48) (-.041) (-.184) (-.76) (4.21) (2.69) (-.803) (3.18) (-2.86) 
Grants * .197** .19** .286** .138 .221** .43** .308** -.18* .261* 
Dem. Inc. (1.76) (1.7) (2.15) ( 1.22) (1.81) (2.58) 2.61 (-1.29) (1.44) 
Personal .543** .541** .701** .269** 
Contact (6.11) (2.73) (8.0) (2.62) 
Mail .516** .614** .572** .291 ** 
Contact (4.64) (4 .5) (5.52) (2.15) 
Media .36** .975** .748** .47** 
Contact (2.14) (6.79) (4.32) (2.09) 
Indirect .144* .064** .17** .298** 
Contact (1.62) (.372) (1.94) (2.92) 
Name -.286** 
Recall (-2.19) 
Name .122 
Recognize ( .421) 
Likes 1.27** 
(9.39) 
Dislikes -1.05** 
(-7 .1) 
Dem. Inc. -2.41 ** -2.31* -3.5** -1.74 -2.88* -5.1 ** -3.92** 2.22 -3.42* 
(-1.71) (-1.65) (-2.1) (-1.23) (-1.88) (-2.46) (-2.64) (1.27) (-1.5) 
x:.i 154.4t 131.32t 92.5t 150.5t 342.62t 300.44t 451.98t 207.5t 341. lt 
Note: Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates, with t-scores in parentheses. An ** denotes an 
estimate statistically significant. at p=0.05, while ** denotes a p=0.10 level, both one-tailed tests. 
An t indicates a x2 significant at the p=.05 level.
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